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Abstract
Due to the complexity of information or the inaccuracy of decision-makers’ cognition, it is dif-
ficult for experts to quantify the information accurately in the decision-making process. However,
the integration of the fuzzy set and game theory provides a way to help decision makers solve
the problem. This research aims to develop a methodology for solving matrix game with payoffs
represented by triangular dual hesitant fuzzy numbers (TDHFNs). First, the definition of TD-
HFNs with their cut sets are presented. The inequality relations between two TDHFNs are also
introduced. Second, the matrix game with payoffs represented by TDHFNs is investigated. More-
over, two TDHFNs programming models are transformed into two linear programming models to
obtain the numerical solution of the proposed fuzzy matrix game. Furthermore, a case study is
given to to illustrate the efficiency and applicability of the proposed methodology. Our results also
demonstrate the advantage of the proposed concept of TDHFNs.
Keywords: matrix game, hesitant fuzzy set, triangular dual hesitant fuzzy numbers, multi-
objective programming.
1 Introduction
Game theory, an effective method to handle the problems in which two conflicting interests exist,
has been extensively applied in some fields, such as marketing and finance. In classic game theory,
payoffs are assumed to be precise. However, many problems cannot be explained in a simple crisp
sense due to the complexity of the problem or a lack of adequate information. Generally, such game
problems can be solved by combining game theory with fuzzy set (FS)[34]. Fuzzy logic-based method
is important for application on many disciplines [22,25,28]. Decision makers sometimes have some
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degree of hesitation in some situations. Their preference information is considered in terms of sup-
port, opposition and their confidence and nonconfidence level about the approximation. The hesitant
fuzzy set (HFS) was originally introduced as an extension of the FS by Torra [26]. The membership
function of HFS is a set composed of several numbers in the interval [0,1], and HFS can describe the
hesitation of the players. Nevertheless,HFS cannot reflect the degree of opposition expressed by the
players. Atanassov proposed an intuitionistic fuzzy set (IFS) characterized by two functions: a mem-
bership function and a non-membership function [5]. However, an IFS cannot describe the hesitation
or difference in opinions of decision makers. Therefore, dual hesitant fuzzy set (DHFS) was proposed
by Zhu et al. [35] to solve the above problems. DHFS consists of two components:a membership hes-
itancy function and a non-membership hesitancy function.DHFS can effectively describe the different
confidence and nonconfidence level about attitudes (support and opposition) of experts.
After Aubin implemented fuzzy theory in a cooperative game model [6], many research works
have been published on this topic. Borkotokey and Neog introduced a dynamic resource allocation
mechanism within the framework of cooperative games with fuzzy coalitions [11]. Wu studied the
cores and dominance cores of cooperative games with fuzzy payoffs [29]. Considering the solution
concepts for fuzzy coalition games under a certain participation level, Yu et al. investigated the
coincident fuzziness form for games with fuzzy coalition [33]. Yang et al. developed a methodology for
solving bi-matrix games with intuitionistic fuzzy number payoffs [32]. Fei and Li proposed a bilinear
programming method for solving interval bi-matrix games [13]. An and Li discussed methodologies
for solving bi-matrix games with intuitionistic fuzzy information [3,4].
Two-person zero-sum games, which are often called matrix game for short, are an important type
of non-cooperative game. Many research works have contributed to the research of the matrix game.
Vijay et al. introduced a fuzzy relation approach to develop two-person zero-sum matrix game with
fuzzy goals and fuzzy payoffs [27]. Collins and Hu considered interval-valued game matrices and
extended the results of classic strictly determined matrix game to fuzzily determined interval games
[12]. Gao et al. investigated two-player zero-sum games with fuzzy payoffs to define the best responses
of the players[15]. They proposed three types of credibilistic equilibria and their existence theorem [15].
Nan and Li investigated methods for solving matrix game with intuitionistic fuzzy information [23,24].
Li developed a fast approach to compute fuzzy game values for two-person zero-sum games with
triangular fuzzy number payoffs [19]. Li and Hong developed a methodology for solving constrained
matrix game with trapezoidal fuzzy number payoffs [20]. Aggarwal et al. investigated a class of linear
programming problems with fuzzy goals or fuzzy constraints to solve two-person zero-sum matrix game
problems with IFSs [2]. Gao and Yu proposed three types of credibilistic equilibria and credibilistic
subgame perfect equilibria for fuzzy extensive games [16]. Bhaumik et al. put forward the robust
ranking technique to solve matrix game with triangular intuitionistic fuzzy number payoffs [9]. As
deterministic payoffs are often unavailable, Figueroa-García et al. developed an uncertain based-
matrix game model involving interval-valued fuzzy payoffs [14]. Jana and Roy discussed dual hesitant
fuzzy matrix game based on the similarity measure between DHFS [18]. Bhaumik and Roy proposed
a new aggregation operator for solving intuitionistic interval-valued hesitant fuzzy matrix games [8].
Bhaumik et al. investigated two-person non-zero-sum game with payoff values represented by the
hesitant interval-valued intuitionistic fuzzy-linguistic term set [10].Furthermore, matrix game theory
has various applications, including decision making and intelligent manufacturing [30,31]. Therefore,
it is necessary to research matrix game with DHFS.
In this paper, we propose the concept of triangular dual hesitant fuzzy numbers (TDHFNs), which
can reflect the different level for decision-makers’ attitudes (support and opposition). Moreover, the
cut set of TDHFNs is also investigated. Our work is focus on developing the matrix game with payoffs
represented by TDHFNs.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, definitions and properties of
TDHFNs are described. Section 3 proposes a programming method for matrix game with payoffs
represented by TDHFNs. In section 4, an empirical case is given to illustrate the proposed method.
Finally, section 5 draws conclusions.
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2 Definition of TDHFNs and solution for matrix game with payoffs
represented by TDHFNs
In this section, the definition and some properties of TDHFNs are presented. Using the definitions
and operations of TDHFNs, the ranking order of TDHFNs is described. Based on the ranking order
and the operations, the solution of the matrix game can be obtained by solving a pair of linear
programming model.
Considering a dual hesitant fuzzy set (DHFS) expressed as E = {< x, fE(x) > |x ∈ X}[35], where
fE(x) =< at, at, at;µa˜t , νa˜t > (t = 1, · · · , N) is a dual hesitant fuzzy number representing the possible
membership and non-membership degrees of element x ∈ X to E, respectively.
The possible membership functions are formulated as follows
µa˜t(x) =

x−at
at−atwa˜t , at ≤ x ≤ at,
a¯t−x
a¯t−atwa˜t , at < x ≤ a¯t,
0, x < at or x > a¯t.
(1)
The possible non-membership functions are formulated as follows
va˜t(x) =

at−x+ua˜t (x−at)
at−at , at ≤ x ≤ at,
x−at+ua˜t (a¯t−x)
a¯t−at , at < x ≤ a¯t,
1, x < at or x > a¯t.
(2)
where wa˜t and ua˜t represent the maximum possible membership degree and the minimum possible
non-membership degree of element x belonging to E, respectively. Moreover, these values satisfy the
conditions 0 ≤ wa˜t ≤ 1, 0 ≤ ua˜t ≤ 1, and 0 ≤ wa˜t + ua˜t ≤ 1.
Definition 1. a˜ =< (at, at, a¯t);wa˜t , ua˜t > is called a triangular dual hesitant fuzzy number (TDHFN).
If at ≥ 0, a¯t > 0(t = 1, · · · , N), then a˜ =< (a−
t
, at, a¯t);wa˜t , ua˜t > is called a positive TDHFN,
denoted by a˜>d0. Similarly, if a¯t ≤ 0 , at < 0(t = 1, · · · , N), then a˜ =< (at, at, a¯t);wa˜t , ua˜t > is called
a negative TDHFN, denoted by a˜ <d 0. Let>d and <d denote "dual hesitant fuzzy greater than" and
"dual hesitant fuzzy less than", respectively.
Definition 2. Let a˜ be a TDHFN. The α-cut set of a˜ is defined as a˜α = {x|µa˜t(x) ≥ α}.The β-cut set
of a˜ is a˜<α,β> = {x|µa˜t ≥ α, va˜t ≤ β}, where α ∈ [0,min{wa˜t}], β ∈ [max{ua˜t}, 1] and 0 ≤ α+ β ≤ 1.
According to definition 2, the following theorem can be obtained.
Theorem 1. Let a˜ be a TDHFN, a˜<α,β> can be calculated as a˜<α,β> = a˜α ∩ a˜β.
Definition 3. If a˜α ≤ b˜α and a˜β ≤ b˜β, then a˜ is called not greater than b˜, which denoted as a˜ ≤d b˜.
Similarly to the intuitionistic fuzzy number ranking relationship, let a˜i =< (ai, ai, a¯i);wa˜i , ua˜i >
and a˜j =< (aj , aj , a¯j);wa˜j , ua˜j >, if a˜iα ≤ a˜jα and a˜βi ≤ a˜βj , then a˜i ≤ a˜j(0 ≤ i, j ≤ N).
Remark 1. In this paper, the elements of a˜ are arranged according to the increasing order.
Definition 4. Let a˜ = (a˜1, · · · , a˜N ), then ξ = ςa˜N + (1 − ς)a˜1(0 ≤ ς ≤ 1) is called an additional
element of TDHFN a˜. where ς can be decided according to the risk preference of decision maker.
Definition 5. Let a˜ =< (at, at, a¯t);wa˜t , ua˜t > (t = 1, · · · , N1) and b˜ =< (bt, bt, b¯t);wb˜t , ub˜t > (t =
1, · · · , N2) be two TDHFNs. If N1 = N2, then the TDHFNs are called two normalized TDHFNs.
Definition 6. Let a˜ =< (at, at, a¯t);wa˜t , ua˜t > and b˜ =< (bt, bt, b¯t);wb˜t , ub˜t > (t = 1, · · · , N) be two
normalized TDHFNs, and let λ be a real number. The arithmetic operations of TDHFNs are defined
as follows.
a˜+ b˜ =< (at + bt, at + bt, a¯t + b¯t); min{wa˜t , wb˜t},max{ua˜t , ub˜t} >
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a˜b˜ =

< (atbt, atbt, a¯tb¯t); min{wa˜t , wb˜t},max{ua˜t , ub˜t} >, a˜ >d 0, b˜ >d 0,
< (atb¯t, atbt, a¯tbt); min{wa˜t , wb˜t},max{ua˜t , ub˜t} >, a˜ >d 0, b˜ <d 0,
< (a¯tb¯t, atbt, atbt); min{wa˜t , wb˜t},max{ua˜t , ub˜t} >, a˜ <d 0, b˜ <d 0.
λa˜ =
{
< (λat, λat, λa¯t);wa˜t , ua˜t >, λ > 0,
< (λa¯t, λat, λat);wa˜t , ua˜t >, λ < 0.
a˜−1 =< (1/at, 1/at, 1/a¯t);wa˜t , ua˜t >
Let aˆ = [aL, aU ] be an interval, where aL and aR are the left and right limits of the interval aˆ ,
respectively.
The maximization problem with an interval-valued objective is described as follows respectively.
Ishibuchi and Tanaka [17] investigated the maximization problem with an interval-valued objective as
max{aˆ} ,s.t. aˆ ∈ Ω1 which is equivalent to the following bi-objective programming problem
max{aL, aL + aU2 }
s.t. aˆ ∈ Ω1 (3)
where Ω1 is the set of constraint conditions.
The minimization problem with an interval-valued objective is described as min{aˆ}, s.t. aˆ ∈ Ω2
which is equivalent to the following bi-objective programming problem
max{aU , aL + aU2 }
s.t. aˆ ∈ Ω2 (4)
where Ω2 is the set of constraint conditions.
In the classical matrix game, the payoff function was often expressed by the crisp number. How-
ever, there is often some hesitant fuzzy information about the payoffs. Based on the hesitant fuzzy
information, we can develop the matrix game with payoffs represented by TDHFNs. Assume that
S1 = {α1, α2, · · · , αm} and S2 = {β1, β2, · · · , βn} are the pure strategies for players p1 and p2, respec-
tively. Without loss of generality, the payoff matrix for player p1 is given by A˜ = (a˜ij)m×n, where
a˜ij =< (aijt, aijt, a¯ijt);wa˜ijt , ua˜ijt > (i = 1, · · · ,m; j = 1, · · · , n; t = 1, · · · , N).
The sets of mixed strategies for players p1 and p2 are denoted by X and Y , respectively, where
X = {x = (x1, x2, · · · , xm)|
m∑
i=1
xi = 1, xi ≥ 0}, Y = {y = (y1, y2, · · · , yn)|
n∑
j=1
yj = 1, yj ≥ 0}. If
players p1 and p2 choose mixed strategies x ∈ X,y ∈ Y, respectively. According to definition 6, the
expected payoff E(x,y) can be calculated as follows
E(x,y) = xT A˜y =
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
a˜ijxiyj
=< (
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
aijtxiyj ,
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
aijtxiyj ,
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
a¯ijtxiyj); min{wa˜ijt},max{ua˜ijt} >
The interests of the two players are precisely opposite. The payoff of each player is not only related
to the strategy he chooses, but also depends on the strategy chosen by the opponent. Therefore, each
player considers the strategy chosen by the opponent when determining the strategy that is most
beneficial to himself. Assume that the players are rational. Player p1 should choose the mixed
strategy x ∈ X that maximizes E(x,y), while player p2 is interested in choosing the mixed strategy
y ∈ Y that minimizes E(x,y). If player p1 chooses strategy x, then he could realize a payoff of at
least min
y∈Y
{xT A˜y} However, player p1 wants a larger payoff, so he chooses a strategy that ensures a
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payoff of no less than max
x∈X
min
y∈Y
{xT A˜y}. Similarly, if player p2 choose strategy y, then he could realize
a payoff of at most max
x∈X
{xT A˜y}. However, player p2 wants a smaller payoff, so he chooses a strategy
to ensure a payoff of no more than want less payoff , so he would choose the strategy make the payoff
is no more than min
y∈Y
max
x∈X
{xT A˜y}.
Player p1 chooses a strategy according to the maximin principle, while player p2 chooses his
strategy according to the minimax principle. Therefore, if a pair of mixed strategies (x0,y0) satisfies
x0T A˜y0 = max
x∈X
min
y∈Y
{xT A˜y} = min
y∈Y
max
x∈X
{xT A˜y}, then x0 and y0 are called the optimal strategies for
the two players. x0T A˜y0 is the value of the mixed equilibrium situation. However, the expected
payoff E(x,y) is a TDHFN with the membership degrees and non-memberships. Thus, there do
not exist (x0,y0) meet the two scales at the same time. In fact, the problems max
x∈X
min
y∈Y
{xT A˜y} and
min
y∈Y
max
x∈X
{xT A˜y} are bi-objective programming problems.
Definition 7. Let ν˜ and ω˜ be TDHFNs. Assume that there exist (x∗,y∗, ν˜∗, ω˜∗), where x∗ ∈ X,
y∗ ∈ Y , satisfying the following conditions
(1) x∗T A˜y ≥d ν˜∗ and xT A˜y∗ ≤d ω˜∗,
(2) There do not exist any ν˜ 6= ν˜∗ and ω˜ 6= ω˜∗ such that ν˜ ≥d ν˜∗ and ω˜ ≤d ω˜∗, then, (x∗,y∗, ν˜∗, ω˜∗)
is the solution of the TDHFN-based matrix game, x∗ and y∗ are the optimal strategies of players p1
and p2, respectively, ν˜∗ is the gain-floor for player p1 and ω˜∗ is the loss-ceiling for player p2. Finally,
x∗T A˜y∗ is the payoff of the TDHFN-based matrix game.
For the classic linear programming problem in the crisp environment, the aim is to maximize or
minimize a linear objective function [7,21]. But in many actual situations, decision makers should
specify the objective or constraint functions with fuzzy sets. Assume that each player chooses an
optimal mixed strategy under the other player’s pure strategy. According to definition 7, the optimal
strategy x∗ of player p1 and the optimal strategy y∗ of player p2 can be achieved by solving the
following pair of mathematical programming models
max{ν˜}
s.t.

m∑
i=1
a˜ijxi ≥d ν˜ (j = 1, 2, · · · , n)
m∑
i=1
xi = 1
xi ≥ 0 (i = 1, 2, · · · ,m)
(5)
min{ω˜}
s.t.

n∑
j=1
a˜ijyj ≤d ω˜ (i = 1, 2, · · · ,m)
n∑
j=1
yj = 1
yj ≥ 0 (j = 1, 2, · · · , n)
(6)
According to definition 3, model (5) can be transformed into the following programming model
max{ν˜α, ν˜β}
s.t.

m∑
i=1
(a˜ij)αxi ≥d ν˜α (j = 1, 2, · · · , n)
m∑
i=1
(a˜ij)βxi ≥d ν˜β (j = 1, 2, · · · , n)
m∑
i=1
xi = 1
xi ≥ 0 (i = 1, 2, · · · ,m)
(7)
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Let ν˜α = [νtLα, νtRα ], ν˜β = [νt
β
L, νt
β
R], (a˜ij)α = [La˜ijt(α), Ra˜ijt(α)], (a˜ij)β = [La˜ijt(β), Ra˜ijt(β)] be the
α-cut and β-cut of TDHFNs ν˜ and a˜ij(i = 1, 2, · · · ,m; j = 1, 2, · · · , n), respectively. According to the
interval-valued rank relationship and definition 4, model (7) can be transformed into the following
programming model
max{[νtLα, νtRα ], [νtβL, νtβR]}
s.t.

m∑
i=1
La˜ijt(α)xi ≥ νtLα (j = 1, 2, · · · , n; t = 1, · · · , N)
m∑
i=1
Ra˜ijt(α)xi ≥ νtRα (j = 1, 2, · · · , n; t = 1, · · · , N)
m∑
i=1
La˜ijt(β)xi ≥ νtLβ (j = 1, 2, · · · , n; t = 1, · · · , N)
m∑
i=1
Ra˜ijt(β)xi ≥ νtRβ (j = 1, 2, · · · , n; t = 1, · · · , N)
m∑
i=1
xi = 1
xi ≥ 0 (i = 1, 2, · · · ,m)
(8)
The above proposed model can be transformed into the bi-objective linear programming model as
follows
max{
N∑
t=1
(νtLα + νt
β
L)
2N ,
N∑
t=1
(νtLα + νt
β
L + νt
R
α + νt
β
R)
4N }
s.t.

m∑
i=1
La˜ijt(α)xi ≥ νtLα (j = 1, 2, · · · , n; t = 1, · · · , N)
m∑
i=1
Ra˜ijt(α)xi ≥ νtRα (j = 1, 2, · · · , n; t = 1, · · · , N)
m∑
i=1
La˜ijt(β)xi ≥ νtLβ (j = 1, 2, · · · , n; t = 1, · · · , N)
m∑
i=1
Ra˜ijt(β)xi ≥ νtRβ (j = 1, 2, · · · , n; t = 1, · · · , N)
m∑
i=1
xi = 1
xi ≥ 0 (i = 1, 2, · · · ,m)
(9)
In the context of multi-objective linear programming, it is important to note that the objectives
have different level of importance [17]. In such a situation, the linear weighted average method should
be applied on the multi-objective linear programming problem. Objectives with more weight should be
allocated more achievement levels in comparison to others [1]. Therefore, model (9) can be transformed
into the following linear programming model
max{λ(
N∑
t=1
(νtLα + νt
β
L)
2N ) + (1− λ)(
N∑
t=1
(νtLα + νt
β
L + νt
R
α + νt
β
R)
4N )}
s.t.

m∑
i=1
La˜ijt(α)xi ≥ νtLα (j = 1, 2, · · · , n; t = 1, · · · , N)
m∑
i=1
Ra˜ijt(α)xi ≥ νtRα (j = 1, 2, · · · , n; t = 1, · · · , N)
m∑
i=1
La˜ijt(β)xi ≥ νtLβ (j = 1, 2, · · · , n; t = 1, · · · , N)
m∑
i=1
Ra˜ijt(β)xi ≥ νtRβ (j = 1, 2, · · · , n; t = 1, · · · , N)
m∑
i=1
xi = 1
xi ≥ 0 (i = 1, 2, · · · ,m)
(10)
The parameter λ ∈ [0, 1] can be determined by the decision maker.
https://doi.org/10.15837/ijccc.2020.3.3854 7
According to definitions 1 and 2, the the α-cut and β-cut set of a˜ij =< (aijt, aijt, a¯ijt);wa˜ijt , ua˜ijt >
(i = 1, 2, · · · ,m; j = 1, 2, · · · , n; t = 1, · · · , N) are represented as follows
(a˜ijt)α = [
(wa˜ijt − α)aijt + αaijt
wa˜ijt
,
(wa˜ijt − α)a¯ijt + αaijt
wa˜ijt
] (11)
(a˜ijt)β = [
(1− β)aijt + (β − ua˜ijt)aijt
1− ua˜ijt
,
(1− β)aijt + (β − ua˜ijt)a¯ijt
1− ua˜ijt
] (12)
Therefore, model (10) can be transformed into the following model
max{λ(
N∑
t=1
(νtLα + νt
β
L)
2N ) + (1− λ)(
N∑
t=1
(νtLα + νt
β
L + νt
R
α + νt
β
R)
4N )}
s.t.

m∑
i=1
(wa˜ijt−α)aijt+αaijt
wa˜ij
xi ≥ νtLα (j = 1, 2, · · · , n; t = 1, · · · , N)
m∑
i=1
(wa˜ijt−α)a¯ijt+αaijt
wa˜ijt
xi ≥ νtRα (j = 1, 2, · · · , n; t = 1, · · · , N)
m∑
i=1
(1−β)aijt+(β−ua˜ijt )aijt
1−ua˜ijt xi ≥ νt
L
β (j = 1, 2, · · · , n; t = 1, · · · , N)
m∑
i=1
(1−β)aijt+(β−ua˜ijt )a¯ijt
1−ua˜ijt xi ≥ νt
R
β (j = 1, 2, · · · , n; t = 1, · · · , N)
m∑
i=1
xi = 1
xi ≥ 0 (i = 1, 2, · · · ,m)
(13)
where νtLα, νt
β
L, νt
R
α , νt
β
R and xi(i = 1, 2, · · · ,m) are decision variables, λ ∈ [0, 1], α ∈ [0,min{wa˜ijt ]
and β ∈ [max{ua˜ijt , 1] (0 ≤ α + β ≤ 1)are parameters that can be determined according to the
characteristics of the actual decision problem.
For any given parameters λ, α and β,the optimal solution (x∗(α, β), νL∗α , νR∗α , ν
β∗
L , ν
β∗
R ) can be
obtained by solving model (13). (x∗(α, β), νL∗α , νR∗α , ν
β∗
L , ν
β∗
R ) is the optimal solution of model (10).
x∗(α, β) is the maximin strategy of player p1 at confidence level (α, β). The < α, β >-cut set of the
minimum gain ν˜∗ of player p1, which is represented by ν˜∗<α,β>, can be obtained according to theorem 1.
ν˜∗<α,β> denotes the possible range of ν˜∗ in the < α, β > confidence level. Specifically, if α = 0, β = 1,
it means the largest scope of the minimum gain ν˜∗ of player p1. If α = min{wa˜ijt}, β = max{ua˜ijt},
then ν˜∗<α,β> denotes the minimum range of ν˜∗of player p1 .
Let ω˜α = [ωtLα, ωtRα ],and ω˜β = [ωt
β
L, ωt
β
R] are the α-cut set and β-cut set of TDHFN ω˜, respectively.
Therefore, model (6) can be transformed into the following model
min{λ(
N∑
t=1
(ωtLα + ωt
β
L)
2N ) + (1− λ)(
N∑
t=1
(ωtLα + ωt
β
L + ωt
R
α + ωt
β
R)
4N )}
s.t.

n∑
j=1
(wa˜ijt−α)aijt+αaijt
wa˜ij
yj ≤ ωtLα (i = 1, 2, · · · ,m; t = 1, · · · , N)
n∑
j=1
(wa˜ijt−α)a¯ijt+αaijt
wa˜ijt
yj ≤ ωtRα (i = 1, 2, · · · ,m; t = 1, · · · , N)
n∑
j=1
(1−β)aijt+(β−ua˜ijt )aijt
1−ua˜ijt yj ≤ ωt
L
β (i = 1, 2, · · · ,m; t = 1, · · · , N)
n∑
j=1
(1−β)aijt+(β−ua˜ijt )a¯ijt
1−ua˜ijt yj ≤ ωt
R
β (i = 1, 2, · · · ,m; t = 1, · · · , N)
n∑
j=1
yj = 1
yj ≥ 0 (j = 1, 2, · · · , n)
(14)
where ωtLα, ωt
β
L, ωt
R
α , ωt
β
R and yj(j = 1, 2, · · · , n) are decision variables; λ ∈ [0, 1], α ∈ [0,min{wa˜ijt}]
and β ∈ [max{ua˜ijt}, 1] ,0 ≤ α+ β ≤ 1.
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For any given parameters λ, α and β, the optimal solution (y∗(α, β), ωL∗α , ωR∗α , ω
β∗
L , ω
β∗
R ) can be
obtained by solving model (14). Similarly, (y∗(α, β), ωL∗α , ωR∗α , ω
β∗
L , ω
β∗
R ) is the optimal solution of
model (9). y∗(α, β) is the minimax strategy of player p2 at confidence level (α, β), ω˜∗<α,β> is the
< α, β >-cut set of ω˜∗, and ω˜∗<α,β> denotes the possible range of the maximum loss ω˜∗ of player p2 in
the < α, β > confidence level.
3 Illustrative case
To illustrate the proposed model, we present an illustrative example considering a monopoly com-
pany which plans to produce products with C1 and C2, where C1 and C2 are mutually replaceable
products. In the current highly competitive business environment, it is very important for the enter-
prise to capture the customer effectively. There are two types of customer group,A1 and A2 , in the
market. As the demand for the product is basically fixed, an increase in the sales volume of one will
inevitably lead to a decrease in the sales volume of the other. The company and the customer group
can be regarded as two players, and the price selection for the company and the customer group can
be viewed as a matrix strategy. The payoff matrix of the company is expressed as follows
A˜ =
[{< (150, 155, 160); 0.8, 0.1 >,< (150, 160, 170); 0.9, 0.1 >} {< (135, 138, 140); 0.7, 0.2 >,< (135, 140, 145); 0.8, 0.1 >}
{< (75, 80, 85); 0.6, 0.2 >,< (80, 85, 90); 0.7, 0.1 >} {< (145, 150, 155); 0.6, 0.2 >,< (150, 155, 160); 0.7, 0.1 >}
]
where < (150, 155, 160); 0.8, 0.1 > means that the most possible price of C1 is 155, the lowest
possible price is 150, the highest possible price is 160, the maximum satisfaction of A1 is 0.8, and the
minimum dissatisfaction is 0.1. The other values can be interpreted similarly.
For the given λ = 0.5 (the other values are calculated similarly) and select < α, β >, where
α ∈ [0, 0.6], β ∈ [0.2, 1], models (13) and (14) can be solved using Lingo11, and the optimal strategy
x∗T (α, β) of p1 and the optimal strategy y∗T (α, β) of p2 can be obtained. The < α, β > -cut set of the
minimum gain of player p1 and the maximum loss of player p2 can be calculated according to theorem
1. The results are shown in table 1 and table 2.
Table 1 The max-min strategy and gain-floor cut sets of player p1
< α, β > x∗T (α, β) ν˜∗<α,β>
< 0, 1 > (0.8235, 0.1765) {[136.76, 142.65], [137.65, 147.65]}
< 0.1, 0.8 > (0.8216, 0.1784) {[137.62, 142.04], [138.79, 146.56]}
< 0.2, 0.7 > (0.8197, 0.1803) {[138.06, 141.75], [139.37, 146.06]}
< 0.3, 0.6 > (0.8179, 0.1821) {[138.50, 141.45], [139.95, 145.51]}
< 0.4, 0.5 > (0.8160, 0.1840) {[138.95, 141.17], [140.54, 144.98]}
< 0.5, 0.3 > (0.8141, 0.1859) {[139.81, 140.55], [141.68, 143.90]}
< 0.6, 0.2 > (0.8123, 0.1877) {140.25, [142.26, 143.37]}
Table 2 The min-max strategy and loss-ceiling cut sets of player p2
< α, β > y∗T (α, β) ω˜∗<α,β>
< 0, 1 > (0.1765, 0.8235) {[137.65, 143.53], [137.65, 149.41]}
< 0.1, 0.8 > (0.1742, 0.8258) {[138.43, 142.88], [138.92, 148.05]}
< 0.2, 0.7 > (0.1731, 0.8269) {[138.81, 142.55], [139.55, 147.37]}
< 0.3, 0.6 > (0.1720, 0.8280) {[139.20, 142.23], [140.18, 146.70]}
< 0.4, 0.5 > (0.1709, 0.8291) {[139.59, 141.91], [141.90, 146.02]}
< 0.5, 0.3 > (0.1688, 0.8312) {[140.37, 141.26], [142.08, 144.67]}
< 0.6, 0.2 > (0.1677, 0.8323) {[140.76, 140.94], [142.71, 144.00]}
According to table 1 and table 2, if < α, β >=< 0, 1 >, then
ν˜∗<α,β> = {[136.76, 142.65], [137.65, 147.65]}
which denotes the greatest possible range of minimum gain ν˜∗ of player p1, and
ω˜∗<α,β> = {[137.65, 143.53], [137.65, 149.41]}
denotes the greatest possible range of maximum loss ω˜∗ of player p2. When α is larger and β is smaller,
the lengths of ν˜∗<α,β> and ω˜∗<α,β> are smaller .
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From the above discussion, the concept of TDHFNs proposed in the paper has the advantage
that it can take into account the uncertainty and hesitation inherent in the assessment of decision
makers, and it can also simulate the psychological behavior of decision makers. The proposed matrix
games with payoff represented by TDHFNs makes full use of information from both the market and
consumers.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, a new integrated concept of the triangular fuzzy number and dual hesitant fuzzy set
enables decision makers to express psychological behaviour. The matrix game with payoffs represented
by TDHFNs is investigated. Based on the cut set and operational rules of TDHFNs, the matrix
game with payoffs represented by TDHFNs is transformed into a multi-objective linear programming
problem. Therefore, the numerical solution of the matrix game with payoffs represented by TDHFNs
can derive from a pair of linear programming models. The proposed method is illustrated by the
case of a market pricing problem. The approach is especially appropriate for the decision maker under
hesitant fuzzy environment. More effective methods for developing matrix game theory with TDHFNs
will be investigated in the future.
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